HASTE: Evolving Agent Harnesses Against Emerging Attacks Using Sparse Evidence

Abstract

Agent harnesses play a critical role in defenses by enforcing safety constraints to prevent unsafe actions. However, rapidly emerging attacks outpace manual harness adaptation, motivating automated harness evolution. Yet the signals available for harness evolution are often sparse, such as brief descriptions or a few attack examples in threat reports and preprints. To address this limitation, we introduce HASTE, a multi-agent framework that evolves agent harnesses from sparse threat evidence through an adversarial interplay between safety-specification generation and attack-case generation. Safety specifications guide harness updates toward addressing identified safety vulnerabilities, while attack cases probe for remaining safety vulnerabilities after each update. By feeding evaluation outcomes back into both processes, HASTE enables harness evolution against emerging attacks beyond the initially observed evidence. Experimental results across multiple backbone models, attack types, and evidence forms show that HASTE consistently reduces attack success rates while preserving benign-task utility. The code is available at https://github.com/xxiqiao/HASTE.