An Operational Leakage Metric for Eavesdropping in Joint Sensing and Communications Systems

Abstract

In upcoming integrated sensing and communications (ISAC) systems, security depends on whether an eavesdropper (Eve) can recover data symbols or infer sensing information from a common observation with a legitimate receiver. However, existing information and estimation measures do not quantify this dual risk under finite observation records. This letter introduces the novel metric of operational leakage, which signifies Eve's optimal probability, in the Bayesian sense, of reconstructing communication symbols or estimating a sensing parameter within prescribed distortions. By showing that prior adversarial success probability separates the effect of side information from that of the observation, we propose a conditional Laplace approximation for efficiently evaluating the proposed metric and jointly quantifying the eavesdropping risk to the sensing and communication functionalities. Numerical results showcase that the risk enabled by adversarial observation increases with Eve's signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), conventional metrics do not uniquely determine finite-record adversarial success probability, and that the proposed conditional Gaussian approximation closely follows numerical Bayes evaluation.