Secure Pseudonymetry with DSSS Watermarking for LEO Satellites

Abstract

Low-Earth-orbit (LEO) constellations offer dense signals of opportunity (SOP) for positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) without dedicated navigation infrastructure. However, using these signals passively, by only listening to the downlink, is difficult when beacon/pilot components are weak, signals from multiple satellites overlap, or the receiver cannot reliably identify which satellite generated a given observable. This paper proposes a low-power direct-sequence spread-spectrum (DSSS) watermarking framework that embeds a recoverable pseudonymous satellite identifier and keyed authentication field into a LEO downlink signal. The watermark carries a public satellite pseudonym for identification and a keyed HMAC-SHA256-based authentication field for authorized verification, enabling passive detection and verification without full downlink demodulation. We evaluate the framework in a multi-satellite simulation using Starlink two-line-element (TLE)-derived geometry, Doppler, and link-budget scaling with Sionna RT-based local propagation. The results demonstrate candidate-satellite detection, public-ID recovery, and keyed verification under co-observed satellite interference, with limited perturbation to the simulated beacon/pilot and primary downlink components. The framework targets future transmitter-enabled LEO systems while remaining transparent to legacy receivers that do not process the low-power watermark.