GRAFT: Graphlet-Triggered Backdoor Attack on GNN-Based Hardware Security Systems

Abstract

The globalization of the integrated circuit (IC) supply chain increases the risk of security threats, such as hardware Trojans (HTs) and the theft of intellectual property (IP). Graph Neural Networks (GNNs), among the most powerful deep learning methods for processing graph-structured data, have been widely adopted to detect such threats. However, GNNs are susceptible to backdoor attacks that can maliciously manipulate output predictions toward an adversarial target. These attacks are not only difficult to detect but also compromise the integrity of GNN-based security systems. Most prior work embeds backdoor triggers using randomly generated subgraphs or gradient-guided generative subgraphs. However, such triggers are impractical for GNN-based hardware security applications as they do not guarantee the preservation of circuit functionality. In this paper, we propose GRAFT, a graph let-triggered backdoor attack targeting GNN-based hardware security. GRAFT embeds graphlet-based triggers at either the register-transfer level (RTL) or gate level of the design while preserving the circuit 's original function. We evaluate GRAFT on the ISCAS-85 and TrustHub datasets. Our experimental results demonstrate that GRAFT can effectively evade HT detection and IP piracy detection, achieving an attack success rate (ASR) of up to 100%.