Game-Theoretic Area Coverage Control with Cooperative-Adversarial Multi-Agent Systems

Abstract

We formulate a multi-agent area coverage control problem as a two-player zero-sum game between two agent groups with conflicting goals. Conventional coverage control allocates resources based on an environmental risk density field. In contrast, we generalize this metric by allowing a second group of adversarial agents to generate the spatial risk field. Coupled agent dynamics are linked through the area coverage metric, which functions as the game reward. This framework induces coupled gradient-descent-ascent controllers for the groups. Analysis of a low-dimensional case reveals a Hopf bifurcation dictated by the ratio of the groups' control gains. In the regime dominated by adversarial agents, the system is driven into a periodic chase-evasion cycle. In the regime dominated by ordinary agents, the system converges to a fixed configuration. Numerical simulations validate these theoretical insights. Finally, we characterize the Nash equilibrium conditions. Under this equilibrium, ordinary agents converge to a generalized centroidal Voronoi tessellation, whereas adversarial agents settle at their corresponding equilibrium centroids.