Competitive One-Step-Ahead Control of Friedkin--Johnsen Networks: Potential Games, Stability, and the Price of Competition

Abstract

This paper studies competitive one-step-ahead control of Friedkin-Johnsen networks with overlapping player influence. The one-step interaction is an exact potential game with a unique Nash equilibrium obtained from a symmetric positive-definite system. Sequential best-response sweeps converge for every frozen network state, parallel sweeps obey an exact Jacobi condition (and always converge with two players), and one-sweep implementations require an augmented state-action stability test. For marginal networks, a signed left-right damping condition is sufficient for exact-equilibrium stability and becomes a sharp first-order instability test when its sign is reversed. A resolvent identity clarifies the feedback geometry, while a control-aware centrality identifies the goal conflicts that matter most. We characterize attainable equilibria under unconstrained, convex, and sparse goal restrictions and give a closed form for the same-state welfare loss caused by competition. Numerical examples verify the stability thresholds, geometry, and welfare predictions.